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INTRODUCTION
Appellants M. Dalton Cannon and Patricia Cannon (the
"Cannons") were struck by a vehicle at 6:58 p.m. on February 1,
1990,

while using a pedestrian crosswalk en route to a

University of Utah basketball game.

The Cannons, who were in

their late sixties when the accident occurred, were critically
injured, and are permanently disabled as a result of the
accident.
The crosswalk where the accident occurred is located
on South Campus Drive immediately south of the Huntsman Center.
Two University of Utah police officers had been specifically
assigned that evening to assist pedestrians across the crosswalk
and to control traffic there.

However, at the time of the

accident, the officers had chosen to get out of the bad weather
that evening, and were sitting in their car at the crosswalk
talking.

They were not taking a formal break from their duties,

but rather were simply trying to perform their duties from the
car.

Both officers subsequently admitted that in order to

perform their duties properly, they needed to have been out of
their car, actively managing pedestrian and vehicular flow at
the crosswalk.

The Cannons contend inter alia in this action
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that the officers' negligent failure to perform their assigned
tasks was a proximate cause of the accident that befell them.
The Third District Court, Hon. Richard Moffat
presiding, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant
University of Utah (the "University") on the basis that the
University officers owed no duty of care to the Cannons.

This

ruling was based upon the "public duty" doctrine, as enunciated
in Ferree v. State. 784 P. 2d 149 (Utah 1989).

The Court

initially held that the officers had only a general duty to
ensure public safety.

Relying on Ferree, the Court found that

this general duty to the public was insufficient to create a
special duty of care in favor of the Cannons.

The Court also

rejected the Cannons' claim that the University owed them a duty
of care as business invitees, and struck two affidavits filed by
the Cannons in opposition to the University' s Motion for Summary
Judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.

The University Fails to Distinguish Between The

University's Obligation to Control Traffic In the
First Place and Its Obligation to Do So Competently
Once the Task Was Undertaken.
A.

The Public Duty Rule Is Inapplicable Here.

The University has argued at length concerning the
nature of the public duty rule.

The Cannons have little quarrel

-2160X21953. 1

with the rule itself -- where a public entity owes a duty only
to the public at large, a negligence claim cannot be predicated
on the breach of that public duty alone.
P. 2d 149 (Utah 1989).

Ferree v. State, 784

Applied to this case, the rule might

arguably relieve the University from responsibility for
providing traffic control at the crosswalks in the first
place. l

However, the University fails to make a crucial

distinction here.

The issue in this case is not whether traffic

control should have been provided in the first place.

It is

whether, once the University affirmatively undertook to station
police officers at the crosswalks, those officers had a duty to
act non-negligently.

In this situation, the public duty

doctrine simply does not apply.
All of the cases cited by the University are
distinguishable for this reason.

In the case most heavily

relied upon by the University, State v. Flaniaan. 489 N. E. 2d
1216 (Ind. App. 1989), the plaintiffs were hit by a car while

1

The Cannons contend that the University owed them a duty
of care as business invitees independently of any other duty of
care. University basketball games are highly promoted, revenue
producing events. The University obviously was aware of the
danger posed by high volumes of pedestrian traffic crossing busy
campus streets, based upon its assignment of police to the
crosswalks. In this situation, the University had a duty to take
reasonable measures to protect its invitees while on campus.
-3160X21953. 1

walking along a highway.

There was no allegation that the

police were anywhere in the area when the accident occurred.
The plaintiffs nonetheless sued the State of Indiana, claiming
that it had an obligation to provide safe pedestrian access in
the area.

Thus, the issue in Flaniaan was whether Indiana had a

duty to provide traffic control in the first place, not whether
it had performed a voluntarily assumed duty competently.
The other cases cited by the University are similarly
distinguishable.

In Obrav v. Malmberq, 484 P. 2d 160, 162 (Utah

1971) and Christensen v. Havward. 694 P. 2d 612 (Utah 1984), the
plaintiffs' claims were based upon the defendant sheriffs'
general responsibilities to provide crime control.

Neither case

involved the issue of whether a specifically assumed task had
been performed in a non-negligent manner.
This distinction is also clear in Ferree, supra.

In

Ferree, a prison inmate on a weekend furlough got drunk at a
wedding and later killed a stranger.

The Supreme Court held

that the Department of Corrections' general duty to protect the
public did not create a duty of care in favor of unforeseeable
potential plaintiffs who might somehow be harmed by a released
prisoner.

-4160X21953. 1

The University contends that the officers were only
engaged in pursuing their general duty of traffic control, and
that they had no duty to come to the assistance of anyone in
particular.
untrue.

University Brief at 9.

This assertion is factually

The officers were specifically assigned by the

University to assist pedestrians at the crosswalk where the
Cannons were injured. R. 327/ 329.

One of the officers

acknowledged that their assignment required them to stop traffic
until pedestrians made it across the crosswalk. R. 327.

The

investigating officer similarly stated that it was the officers'
specific duty to make contact with pedestrians at the edge of
the crosswalk, and to advise them when to cross.

R. 329.

Officers Purvis and Beglarian instead chose to return to their
car and get out of the rain.

In short, they attempted to

perform their duties from the car, rather than getting wet and
remaining available to assist pedestrians.
Where, as here, a public entity has assumed a specific
task, such as providing traffic control, it must do so nonnegligently.

Florence v. Goldberg. 375 N. E. 2d 763 (N. Y. App.

1978); Alhambra School Dist. v. Superior Court. 796 P. 2d 470,
474 (Ariz. 1990).

The public duty rule is irrelevant here,

because the University specifically assumed responsibility for
-5160X21953.1

assisting pedestrians at the crosswalks.

A duty of care

therefore existed in favor of those pedestrians.
B.

Where A Specific Class of Victims Exists, A Duty of
Care Arises.
The University argues that a public entity cannot be

held liable in the absence of a particular duty to a specific
individual.
Utah.

University Brief at 7.

This is not the law in

In order for a special relationship sufficient to support

a duty of care to exist, a plaintiff need merely be a part of a
reasonably identifiable group.
1156, 1162 (Utah 1991).

Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P. 2d

Where there is a foreseeable risk of

harm to such an identifiable group from a government entities'
failure to exercise reasonable care, the government entity owes
that group a duty of care to act non-negligently. 1^.

Here, the

University recognized the danger that pre-game traffic would
pose to a specific group - pedestrians using the South Campus
Drive crosswalks prior to basketball games.

It chose to remedy

this danger by assigning officers to assist pedestrians there.
Similarly, the officers recognized the danger of the crosswalks,
and the need to actively assist pedestrians.

Injury to a

specific group was clearly foreseeable as a result of their

-6160X21953.1

failure to do so.

Under Rollins, a duty of care is present

here.
II.

The Restatement (2&) of Torts Supports the Existence
of A Duty of Care In this Case.
The University relies upon Sections 314 through 320 of

the Restatement (Second) of Torts in support of its claims that
no duty of care exists.

As with the case law cited by the

University, this reliance is misplaced.

Section 314A of the

Restatement lists certain situations where a special
relationship creating a duty of care is deemed to exist: common
carriers and their passengers; innkeepers and guests; possessors
of land and their invitees; and custodians and their wards.

The

University insists that this list is the exclusive list of
relationships that give rise to a duty of care.
Brief at 11.

University

In fact, a caveat to Restatement (2d) § 314A

expressly states that this list is not intended to be exclusive,
and the Utah Supreme Court has recognized other such
relationships. See DCR. Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co. , 663 P. 2d 433
(Utah 1983).
The University additionally neglects to mention a more
directly applicable provision of the Restatement (2d) of Torts.
The Restatement (2d) also recognizes the distinction between a
-7160X21953. 1

duty to act in the first place, and the obligation to act nonnegligently once services are undertaken.

Section 323 of the

Restatement (2d) provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration,
to renter services to Another Wfticfr he gfrPVlfl
recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person . .. is subject to liability to the
other for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking,
if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care
increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other' s
reliance upon the undertaking.
(Emphasis added).
In this case, the University undertook to provide
police protection to pedestrians utilizing the South Campus
Drive crosswalks prior to University basketball games.

The

officers knew the area was dangerous at times such as this;
Officer Beglarian testified:
Campus Drive during a game
traffic control, and it' s
go very slow. "

"Yes. I've driven down South
—

or prior and not been assigned

-- it' s really bad.

But I personally

Beglarian Deposition at 52, 1. 22-24.

On the

night in question, the visibility of pedestrians and vehicular
traffic was made worse by the inclement conditions then
prevailing.

Under these circumstances it was critical to the
-8-
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safety of the Cannons and other pedestrians that the officers
remained vigilant and performed their duties properly.
To fulfil their assignment adequately, the officers
needed to meet pedestrians in the crosswalk and either stop the
pedestrians or stop oncoming traffic.

They failed to do so

here, instead remaining in their car while the Cannons were
forced to navigate the crosswalk without assistance.

The

officers failure to perform their assignment in a clearly
dangerous situation obviously increased the risk that a vehiclepedestrian accident would occur.

Restatement (2d) § 323

supports a ruling that the University owed a duty of care to
pedestrians using police-operated crosswalks prior to University
basketball games.
III.

Multiple Factual Issues Preclude Summary Judgment In

Favor of the University.
The trial court also erred in granting summary
judgment because disputed factual issues exist here.

Where

underlying facts are in dispute, the application of the public
duty rule and the existence of a duty of care become a question
of fact.

Estate of Tanasiievich v. City of Hammond, 383 N. E. 2d

1081 (Ind. App. 1978).

The Court of Appeals should note that

the Cannons claim that the University officers were actively
-9160X21953.1

negligent, by allowing marker flares to burn down,2 negligently
parking their vehicle in a manner that obstructed drivers7
views, and otherwise acting negligently.
Principal Brief at 28.

See Appellants'

Even assuming arguendo that the public

duty rule were applicable, the officers were required to refrain
from increasing the risk to pedestrians.

Their failure to do so

precludes summary judgment in favor of the University.
The University' s arguments concerning the public duty
rule, and the trial court' s decision on this issue, also rely
upon disputed facts.

The trial court' s decision states that the

officers were not engaged in traffic control at the time of the
accident.

The court reasoned that since the University might

have no obligation under the public duty rule to provide traffic
control in the first place, the officers total failure to
perform their task excuses any liability.
brief echoes this argument.3

The University' s

In fact, the officers were on

2

The trial court stated that there was "sufficient"
evidence to conclude that the flares were burning, despite
testimony of the driver and of Dr. Cannon that they saw no
flares. Memorandum Decision at 3. This sort of weighing of the
evidence is clearly inappropriate in the context of summary
judgment.
3

The Universi^ : states that the officers were about to
"resume" traffic control at the time of the accident. University
Brief at 4.
-10160X21953.1

active duty at the time of the accident, but were completely
neglecting their duties.

The trial court failed in its

obligation to resolve all doubts concerning factual issue in
favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Durham v.
Maraetts, 571 P. 2d 1332 (Utah 1977).

The various factual

misapprehensions by the trial court require reversal here.

IV.

The Issue of Reliance, Even if Relevant, Involves

Disputed Issues of Fact.
The University places major emphasis on one statement
Dr. Cannon made in his deposition.

Dr Cannon stated that, when

he and his wife arrived at the crosswalk, they saw the police
car,

but no police officers.

This was of course because the

officers were inside their car talking and staying out of the
weather, rather than performing their duties.

Dr. Cannon states

that because the Cannons saw no police to help them, they
proceeded across the crosswalk.

After passing immediately in

front of the officers car, they stepped into the westbound lanes
of South Campus Drive and were hit.
The University argues that, because the Cannons saw
that no officers would be assisting them, and proceeded to
attempt to cross the street anyway, they did not rely on police
assistance.

The University argues that this alleged lack of
-11-
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reliance means that no special relationship arose between them
and the officers sufficient to support a duty of care.
University Brief at 15.

Initially, it is important to note that

reliance is unnecessary as a matter of law for the creation of a
duty of care in these circumstances.

Section 323 of the

Restatement (2d) of Torts provides that one who undertakes to
provide services to another is subject to liability if his
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm,
without reference to reliance by the plaintiff.

In addition, it

would be pernicious public policy to allow public officers to
escape liability by completely failing to perform their assigned
duties, and then claiming that the injured victim had not relied
upon their presence.

The fact that the Cannons were forced to

attempt to cross South Campus Drive without assistance does not
prevent a duty of care from arising.
Even if proof of reliance were necessary, the issue is
one of fact, and not appropriate for summary judgment.

Dr.

Cannon submitted an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment
stating that one of the reasons he and Mrs. Cannon used the
crosswalk was the typical availability of police traffic
control.

The trial court struck this affidavit as contradictory

to his previous deposition testimony, in which he stated that
-12160X21953.1

other parking sites on the University campus involved climbing
many stairs.4

As more fully set forth in the Cannons'

principal brief, the affidavit and Dr. Cannon' s deposition
testimony are simply not contradictory.

Unless any

inconsistency between deposition testimony and an affidavit is
completely implausible

-- which is not the case here -- an

affidavit creating a question of fact should not be stricken.
Gaw v. State bv and through UDOT, 798 P. 2d 1130, 1140-41 (Utah
App.

1990).

The issue of reliance, if relevant at all, is a

factual issue, and one that should not have figured in a
decision on summary judgment.
V.

The Cannons Were Business Invitees.
The University argues that it is not responsible for

taking reasonable actions to protect the safety of pedestrians
on South Campus Drive before basketball games, because the Utah
Department of Transportation ("UDOT") holds title to South
Campus Drive.

It further argues that it has no duty of care

towards those injured off the premises that it owns.

4

The

The trial court also held that the affidavit was not filed
timely, because it was filed on the day before the summary
judgment hearing. Rule 6(d) U. R, C. P. permits affidavits to be
filed the day before a summary judgment hearing. See Beaufort
Concrete Co. v. Atlantic States Constr. Co. , 352 F. 2d 460, 462
(5th Cir. 1965)(interpreting identical federal rule).
-13160X21953.1

problem with the University' s argument is that it is possession
of land, not ownership, that determines whether a duty of care
is created.

Section 344 of the Restatement (2d) of Torts

provides that a possessor of land is subject to liability for
the negligent acts of third parties where it has failed to
exercise reasonable care to protect them from the harm.

This

section of the Restatement imposes an affirmative duty on
possessors of land to exercise care in protecting the safety of
invitees.
The University should not be able to escape liability
here simply because UDOT holds legal title to South Campus
Drive.

The University, not UDOT, advertises and encourages

public attendance at University basketball games.

The

University, not UDOT, makes parking lots on the south side of
South Campus Drive available to spectators who are en route to
the Huntsman Center, directly across the street.

Most

importantly, the University, not UDOT, was physically in
possession of South Campus Drive when the accident occurred.
The Cannons claim is based upon the

University' s failure to

protect those it invited to the University campus. The
University obviously recognized the dangers posed by the
combination of heavy pedestrian and vehicle traffic at the
-14160X21953.1

crosswalks, because it, not UDOT, specifically assigned officers
to assist pedestrians there.

It is equitable that the

University be required to exercise due care to protect invitees.

CONCLUSION
The University' s brief seeks to gloss over certain
crucial facts that distinguish this case from typical "public
duty" cases.

The University obviously recognized the danger

posed to its invitees by the crosswalks, because it specifically
assigned officers to assist pedestrians there.

Those officers

recognized that, to prevent accidents, they had to be out of
their car directing traffic and pedestrians.

Unfortunately, the

officers here neglected their assigned task, and the Cannons
were injured as a result.

This is not a case where the officers

failed to perform only some generalized public duty.

Instead,

the officers negligently performed a specific assigned task in
the face of a recognized danger to those they were assigned to
protect.

The officers owed a duty of care to the Canons.

trial court' s decision should be reversed, and this case
remanded for trial.

-15160X21953. 1

The
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Z3
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